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____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 These cross-appeals require us to decide whether 
mentally ill residents of New Jersey who have been 
committed to state custody are entitled to judicial process 
before they may be forcibly medicated in nonemergency 
situations. At issue is Administrative Bulletin 5:04B, a 
procedure regulating the forcible administration of 
psychotropic drugs in New Jersey psychiatric hospitals, and 
its validity under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the 
United States Constitution. The District Court held that AB 
5:04B is valid, except as to patients who have been found by 
a court not to require continued commitment but who remain 
in custody pending transfer. Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. 
Velez, 974 F. Supp. 2d 705 (D.N.J. 2013). We will affirm the 
result reached by the District Court, though not for all its 
stated reasons. 
I 
A 
 The New Jersey Department of Human Services 
operates four psychiatric hospitals that house civilly 
committed adults and those who have been found 
incompetent to stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity. 
See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:1-7. Temporary civil commitment 
may be ordered by a New Jersey court only upon a showing 
of probable cause to believe that the person is “in need of 
involuntary commitment to treatment,” id. § 30:4-27.10(g), 
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which means that he is dangerous to himself, others, or 
property by reason of mental illness and is unwilling to accept 
treatment voluntarily, id. § 30:4-27.2(m). Within 20 days of 
the patient’s initial admission to a facility, the court must hold 
a final commitment hearing at which the State must make the 
same showing by clear and convincing evidence in order to 
prolong the commitment. Id. § 30:4-27.15(a); N.J. Ct. R. 
4:74-7(c)(1). 
 The final hearings occur at New Jersey’s psychiatric 
hospitals but have many of the trappings of conventional 
judicial proceedings. Each patient has the right to be 
represented by counsel, to be present at the hearing, to present 
evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses. N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 30:4-27.14; N.J. Ct. R. 4:74-7(e). A psychiatrist on the 
patient’s treatment team who has examined the patient within 
five days of the hearing must testify. N.J. Ct. R. 4:74-7(e). 
Commitment hearings take place one or two days per week at 
each hospital, and most are uncontested and brief.  
 If a patient is committed, his status is subject to 
judicial review three months after the final hearing and 
periodically thereafter. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-27.16(a). At 
every review hearing, the State is required to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that the involuntary commitment 
standard remains satisfied. Id. If the court concludes that the 
patient no longer requires commitment, it can order him 
discharged or enter a judgment of “conditional extension 
pending placement” (CEPP). N.J. Ct. R. 4:74-7(h)(1)–(2). 
Patients on CEPP status remain in the hospital only because 
an appropriate alternative placement is unavailable; their 
status is reviewed within 60 days of the CEPP order’s 
issuance and then periodically at intervals no longer than six 
months. N.J. Ct. R. 4:74-7(h)(2). 
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B 
 The recent history of civil commitment of the mentally 
ill in this country is inextricably linked with the development 
of psychotropic drugs—antipsychotics, antidepressants, mood 
stabilizers, and the like. According to an expert report 
submitted to the District Court, effective psychotropic 
medications emerged in the 1950s and “rapidly became a 
mainstay of treatment” in psychiatric hospitals “because of 
their effectiveness in reducing or eliminating psychotic 
symptoms, including delusions, hallucinations, disordered 
thinking and speech, and disruptive and aggressive behavior.” 
App. 468 (report of Dr. Paul S. Appelbaum). Witnesses 
testified that the proper use of psychotropic drugs is “an 
almost essential component of treatment for a patient who is 
severely enough disturbed to require involuntary 
hospitalization,” App. 765, and agreed that “psychotropic 
medications are almost universally a part of successful 
treatment for patients in psychiatric hospitals,” App. 781. 
 For all their benefits, psychotropic drugs can cause 
serious side effects, including muscle cramps, dizziness, 
metabolic syndrome, parkinsonism, akathesia (motor 
restlessness), dystonia (involuntary muscle contractions), and 
tardive dyskinesia (involuntary movement of the limbs or 
facial muscles). Disability Rights alleges that side effects that 
have been observed in New Jersey’s psychiatric hospitals 
include fatigue, difficulty walking, confusion, anxiety, sexual 
dysfunction, and allergic or toxic reactions to the drugs. For 
these reasons (and perhaps others), significant numbers of 
civilly committed psychiatric patients refuse to take 
psychotropic medication voluntarily, however beneficial it 
might be from a clinical perspective. In 2011 and 2012, 
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between 29 and 48 patients were on “refusing status” and 
subject to forcible medication at each of the State’s four 
psychiatric hospitals. App. 1144. 
 The Supreme Court has never decided whether civilly 
committed individuals have a constitutional right to refuse 
psychotropic drugs. It issued a writ of certiorari in 1981 in a 
case posing this question, but an intervening state court 
decision ultimately prevented the Court from reaching the 
merits. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). And although 
the Court has spoken time and again on the right to refuse 
unwanted treatment generally, it has not addressed this issue 
in the civil commitment context. See, e.g., Sell v. United 
States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (concerning the right of a 
criminal defendant to refuse antipsychotic medication 
intended to render him competent to stand trial); Washington 
v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (concerning the due process 
rights of prisoners subject to forcible medication for mental 
illness); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (concerning the 
due process rights of children institutionalized for mental 
health care). In Harper, the most relevant of these cases for 
our purposes, the Court held that the Due Process Clause 
permits a State to forcibly medicate a dangerous, mentally ill 
prisoner without providing a judicial hearing as long as 
certain “essential procedural protections” are provided. 494 
U.S. at 236. 
 Unlike the Supreme Court, we have squarely 
addressed the right of civilly committed psychiatric patients 
to refuse psychotropic drugs. In 1977, a man involuntarily 
committed to a psychiatric hospital in New Jersey filed suit in 
federal court challenging the State’s use of forcible 
medication in nonemergency situations. Rennie v. Klein, 462 
F. Supp. 1131, 1134 (D.N.J. 1978). Shortly thereafter, New 
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Jersey adopted Administrative Bulletin 78-3, which became 
known as the “Rennie process” and generally consisted of 
three steps: 
[1] At the first level, when a patient refuses to 
accept medication, the treating physician must 
explain to the patient the nature of his 
condition, the rationale for using the particular 
drug, and the risks or benefits of it as well as 
those of alternative treatments. [2] If the patient 
still declines, the matter is discussed at a 
meeting of the patient’s treatment team, which 
is composed of the treating physician and other 
hospital personnel, such as psychologists, social 
workers, and nurses who have regular contact 
with the patient. The patient is to be present at 
this meeting if his condition permits. 
 [3] If, after the team meeting, the 
impasse remains, the medical director of the 
hospital or his designee must personally 
examine the patient and review the record. In 
the event the director agrees with the 
physician’s assessment of the need for 
involuntary treatment, medication may then be 
administered. The medical director is also 
authorized, but not required, to retain an 
independent psychiatrist to evaluate the 
patient’s need for medication. Finally, the 
director is required to make a weekly review of 
the treatment program of each patient who is 
being drugged against his will to determine 
whether the compulsory treatment is still 
necessary. 
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Rennie v. Klein (Rennie I), 653 F.2d 836, 848–49 (3d Cir. 
1981) (en banc) (citations omitted), judgment vacated and 
remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982). We upheld this procedure 
in Rennie I, id. at 851–52, and then upheld it again in Rennie 
v. Klein (Rennie II), 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (en banc), 
after the Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Rennie I and 
remanded the matter for further consideration in light of 
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). We essentially 
held in the Rennie cases that civilly committed psychiatric 
patients “have a qualified constitutional right to refuse 
antipsychotic medication” in nonemergency situations and 
“the procedures set forth in Administrative Bulletin 78-3 
accommodate [that right] in a manner consistent with the Due 
Process Clause.” Rennie II, 720 F.2d at 272 (Seitz, C.J., 
concurring). Notably, we indicated in Rennie I that committed 
individuals are entitled to at least as much constitutional 
protection in this context as prisoners. See 653 F.2d at 845–
46. The Rennie process was incorporated into a consent order 
entered by the District Court in August 1984 that governed 
the forcible medication of the mentally ill in New Jersey for 
almost 30 years.  
C 
 Disability Rights New Jersey, a nonprofit organization 
that advocates for the disabled, filed a complaint in August 
2010 in the District Court against New Jersey and the 
Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Human 
Services, alleging that the Rennie process violated various 
provisions of the United States Constitution, as well as the 
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The crux of the suit 
was that the Rennie process was nothing more than a “rubber 
stamp” for hospital staff members who wished to forcibly 
medicate their patients, App. 111 (Compl. ¶ 85), though 
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Disability Rights also alleged that New Jersey’s hospitals 
failed to properly comply with the procedure. As amended, 
the complaint requested declaratory and injunctive relief 
invalidating the Rennie process and ordering the State to 
provide judicial hearings before involuntarily committed 
psychiatric patients could be forcibly medicated in 
nonemergent situations. The complaint also demanded 
additional procedural protections accompanying a judicial 
hearing, including: a requirement that nonemergent forcible 
medication take place only after a finding that the patient is 
incompetent to make medical decisions; a right to counsel at 
the hearing; establishment of a system of “experienced and 
knowledgeable” counsel to advocate for patients’ interests; a 
right to have independent expert witnesses appointed; 
imposition of a “clear and convincing evidence” burden of 
proof in forcible medication proceedings; assurance that 
hospital staff would be properly trained in the administration 
of psychotropic drugs; and a requirement that the State report 
monthly to Disability Rights on its use of psychotropic 
medication in psychiatric hospitals. App. 321–22 (Am. 
Compl. ¶ 6). In sum, Disability Rights demanded that the 
State “provide patients who refuse the non-emergency 
administration of psychotropic medication with meaningful 
due process protections—including legal counsel, notice and 
a hearing before a judicial decision-maker—before such 
persons may be involuntarily medicated.” App. 248 (Am. 
Compl. ¶ 11). 
 The State moved to dismiss and argued that Disability 
Rights’ claims were precluded by our decisions in the Rennie 
cases, but the District Court disagreed. Disability Rights N.J., 
Inc. v. Velez, 2011 WL 2976849, at *6–11 (D.N.J. July 20, 
2011). The Court observed that Rennie I “specifically held 
that the involuntarily committed patients were to be accorded 
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no fewer constitutional protections than prisoners,” id. at *9 
(citing 653 F.2d at 846), and the Supreme Court held in 
Harper (several years after Rennie) that mentally ill prisoners 
facing forcible medication were entitled to procedural 
protections that “dwarf[ed]” what the Rennie process 
provided, id. at *10. After the District Court denied most of 
the motion to dismiss, the State moved to vacate the 1984 
Rennie consent order, and the Court obliged in March 2012. 
 In June 2012, while Disability Rights’ lawsuit 
remained pending, the State replaced the Rennie process with 
two separate policies for forcible treatment in emergencies 
(AB 5:04A) and nonemergent situations (AB 5:04B). Under 
the emergency procedure of AB 5:04A, which Disability 
Rights has not challenged, a patient who “presents a risk of 
imminent or reasonably impending harm or danger to self or 
others” can be forcibly medicated for up to 72 hours unless a 
less restrictive alternative method is available. App. 1423, 
1425. The patient must be reassessed every 24 hours to 
determine whether the emergency persists.  
 The nonemergency policy challenged here, AB 5:04B 
(the Policy), imposes more stringent requirements because it 
permits longer-term forcible medication. The Policy provides 
that a psychiatric patient can be forcibly medicated only if he 
has been involuntarily committed, “has been diagnosed with a 
mental illness, and, as a result of mental illness, poses a 
likelihood of serious harm to self, others, or property if 
psychotropic medication is not administered[.]” App. 1393. 
This means that there must be a “substantial risk” that the 
patient will do physical harm to himself, another person, or 
property “within the reasonably foreseeable future.” App. 
1396. A risk of harm to self must be indicated by “threats or 
attempts to commit suicide, or to inflict physical harm on 
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one’s self, or by such severe self-neglect as evidenced by a 
dangerous deterioration in essential functioning and repeated 
and escalating loss of cognitive and volitional control as is 
essential for the individual’s health and safety”; a risk of 
harm to others must be indicated by “behavior which has 
caused [physical] harm or which places another person or 
persons in reasonable fear of sustaining such harm”; and a 
risk of harm to property must be indicated by “behavior 
which has caused substantial loss or damage to property.” Id. 
 Patients thought to satisfy the substantive requirements 
of the Policy may be forcibly medicated only pursuant to 
procedures that, though extensive, stop short of prior judicial 
review. First, the patient’s treating physician must complete 
an involuntary medication administration report, which 
documents the patient’s diagnosis, the medication and dosage 
contemplated, the rationale for concluding that the patient 
satisfies the substantive standard outlined above, the less 
restrictive alternatives considered and rejected, the efforts 
made to explain to the patient the need for medication, and 
any objections expressed by the patient. Next, the hospital’s 
medical director appoints a three-person panel chaired by a 
psychiatrist who may be a hospital employee but who may 
not be currently involved in the patient’s treatment. The other 
members of the panel must be a hospital administrator and a 
clinician, neither of whom may be currently involved in the 
patient’s treatment. 
 At a medication review hearing held on the patient’s 
ward within five days of the involuntary medication 
administration report being submitted to the medical director, 
the panel hears evidence to determine whether to approve 
involuntary medication. The patient has the right to be 
notified of the hearing, attend the hearing, testify, present 
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evidence and witnesses, cross-examine witnesses, and have a 
mental health professional or legal counsel present (at the 
patient’s expense). The patient is also afforded the assistance 
of the hospital’s client services advocate, a psychiatric nurse 
who consults with the patient and assists him in presenting 
evidence and making objections at the hearing. After the 
hearing, involuntary medication will be authorized only if the 
chair and at least one other member of the panel agree that the 
substantive standard is satisfied. The patient has 24 hours to 
appeal the panel’s decision to the medical director, and 
administration of the medication can begin immediately if the 
panel’s decision is affirmed. Any further appeal must be 
made to the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior 
Court. See N.J. Ct. R. 2:2-3(a)(2). 
 The initial approval of forcible medication is valid for 
14 days. Within 12 days of that approval, the treating 
psychiatrist must report on “the patient’s positive and 
negative responses to the medication, what less restrictive 
interventions have been attempted or ruled out, and whether 
the patient is continuing to withhold consent.” App. 1400. A 
panel—which need not comprise the same people as before—
may then authorize forcible medication lasting up to 90 days. 
Throughout that period, the treating prescriber must submit 
biweekly reports to the medical director detailing the patient’s 
progress. If, at the end of 90 days, the patient still does not 
consent to medication, the hospital must start the entire 
process over again in order to continue the forcible 
medication.  
 The Policy applies to all involuntarily committed 
psychiatric patients in New Jersey—including CEPP patients, 
though the State says it has been invoked against them “very 
rarely.” N.J. Br. 69 n.14. In 255 total medication review 
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hearings held during the six months following the Policy’s 
implementation, panels approved medication in all but six 
cases, and medical directors affirmed in 55 out of 56 appeals. 
App. 2658. In the District Court, Disability Rights attributed 
this near-uniformity at least in part to the hospitals’ 
noncompliance with various components of the Policy and 
reliance on weak and stale evidence of dangerousness.  
II 
 New Jersey’s replacement of the Rennie process with 
the Policy did not resolve the litigation because the Policy did 
not go as far as Disability Rights requested in its complaint. 
For example, the Policy did not require premedication judicial 
process, a “clear and convincing” showing of incompetence, a 
right to counsel in medication review proceedings, or a right 
to appointed experts. See supra Section I-C. In November 
2012, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 
At that point, the District Court had before it Disability 
Rights’ claims that the Policy on its face1 violated the ADA, 
the Rehabilitation Act, and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (encompassing due process 
                                                 
 1 Although Disability Rights has repeatedly asserted 
during this litigation that the State has failed to consistently 
comply with its nonemergency forcible medication policies, it 
has done this to point up the policies’ shortcomings rather 
than to raise any as-applied claims. See, e.g., App. 459–60 
(“DRNJ admits that it challenges the [c]onstitutionality of 
[AB 5:04B] . . . . In pursuing this claim, however, DRNJ does 
not foreclose itself . . . from asserting that Defendants are 
failing to follow the New Policy. DRNJ admits that it is not 
challenging medical treatment decisions for any individual 
patients.”). 
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generally, the right of access to the courts, the right to 
counsel, and the incorporated First Amendment right to freely 
think and communicate).2 See Disability Rights, 974 F. Supp. 
2d at 711. 
 The District Court held that the Policy withstood 
Disability Rights’ statutory and constitutional challenges, 
except with respect to CEPP patients. As to non-CEPP 
patients, the Court rejected Disability Rights’ ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act claims on two grounds: first, that the 
Policy is a “legitimate safety requirement” permitted by 
federal regulation, id. at 739 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(h)); 
and second, that “‘adequate justification’ exists for 
differential treatment of the relevant class because the 
treatment is not based on disability, but based on a finding of 
dangerousness,” id. (quoting Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 
527 U.S. 581, 612 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
judgment)). As to CEPP patients, however, the Court granted 
summary judgment to Disability Rights on the statutory 
claims because those patients have already been found by a 
court of law not to be dangerous, and any “volatility” or 
relapse into dangerousness could be addressed using the 
emergency provisions of AB 5:04A or the recommitment 
process. Id. at 738. 
 The due process inquiry yielded the same results. With 
respect to non-CEPP patients, the District Court concluded 
that the Supreme Court’s analysis of the due process rights of 
prisoners in Harper required a decision in New Jersey’s 
                                                 
 2 The District Court dismissed a claim arising under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
2011. Disability Rights, 2011 WL 2976849, at *15–16. 
Disability Rights did not appeal that decision. 
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favor. The Court concluded that the Policy and the procedure 
upheld in Harper are “strikingly similar” and applied the 
logic of that decision to the civil commitment context. Id. at 
724, 728. Again, the Court declined to extend this ruling to 
CEPP patients, holding that the State had “no interest in 
continuing to forcibly medicate” such people after they have 
been adjudicated not to be dangerous. Id. at 729. As for 
Disability Rights’ claims based on the right to counsel, the 
right of access to the courts, and the right to think and 
communicate freely, the Court held that these claims were 
either duplicative of the general due process claim or could be 
resolved on the same grounds. See id. at 728, 729 n.9. 
 Having found the Policy valid except as to CEPP 
patients, the District Court enjoined New Jersey’s hospitals 
from using it to forcibly medicate CEPP patients but 
otherwise let it stand. See id. at 740. Disability Rights filed a 
timely notice of appeal, and the State followed with a timely 
cross-appeal. 
III 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1343(a). We have jurisdiction to review the 
District Court’s summary judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We review summary judgments de novo, applying the 
same test as the District Court. MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal 
Indem. Co., 426 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2005). Summary 
judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
“We may affirm a district court for any reason supported by 
the record.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
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IV 
 Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination against 
the disabled in public services, programs, and activities. 
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004). Its core 
provision states: “no qualified individual with a disability 
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity.”3 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To 
state a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show that he is a 
“qualified individual with a disability”; that he was excluded 
from a service, program, or activity of a public entity; and 
that he was excluded because of his disability. Id. Public 
entities include States and their subdivisions, id. § 12131(1), 
and mental illness qualifies as a disability under the statute, 
id. § 12102(1)(A). 
 The antidiscrimination mandate of Title II is not 
absolute. Federal regulations excuse States from complying 
with the ADA with respect to disabled people who pose a 
“direct threat” to others, as long as the States make these 
determinations using comprehensive “individualized 
                                                 
 3 Title II and its implementing regulations 
“incorporate[] the ‘non-discrimination principles’” of the 
Rehabilitation Act, Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331 (3d 
Cir. 1995), and the statutes’ core provisions are substantively 
identical, see 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (“No otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her 
or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance[.]”). Hereafter we refer to the ADA alone. 
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assessment[s].” 28 C.F.R. § 35.139. States may also “impose 
legitimate safety requirements necessary for the safe 
operation of [their] services, programs, or activities” so long 
as such requirements “are based on actual risks, not on mere 
speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals 
with disabilities.” id. § 35.130(h). Finally, the regulations 
permit States to avoid Title II’s requirements when the 
modifications needed to ensure compliance would 
“fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or 
activity” at issue. id. § 35.130(b)(7). 
 Consistent with the District Court’s opinion, New 
Jersey’s defense of the Policy rests largely on these 
exceptions to Title II’s antidiscrimination mandate. In our 
view, however, there is a dispositive threshold question: does 
the Policy exclude civilly committed psychiatric patients from 
a service, program, or activity of the State? In other words, is 
it actually discriminatory within the meaning of the ADA? 
A 
First we must determine the nature of the service, 
program, or activity posited by Disability Rights. At oral 
argument, Disability Rights limited the “service, program, or 
activity” from which psychiatric patients in New Jersey are 
allegedly excluded under the Policy to the right to judicial 
process before being administered medication in nonemergent 
situations. Yet in its briefing to the Court, Disability Rights 
inconsistently referred to the “service, program, or activity” 
as the right to refuse medical treatment. Our Court has made 
clear that the phrase “service, program, or activity” is 
extremely broad in scope and includes “anything a public 
entity does.” Yeskey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 118 F.3d 168, 171 
(3d Cir. 1997); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(vii) (Title II 
regulations provide that “[a] public entity, in providing any 
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aid, benefit, or service, may not, directly or through 
contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, . . . limit a 
qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any 
right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others 
receiving the aid, benefit, or service.” (emphasis added)). 
Although we assume that the right to refuse medical treatment 
(or another such right, whether it be common-law or 
statutory) could be a service, program, or activity within the 
meaning of Title II, this is not the service, program, or 
activity posited by Disability Rights.  
Disability Rights’ briefs betray considerable confusion 
over the nature of the service, program, or activity in 
question. At two pages of its opening brief, for example, 
Disability Rights indicates that the relevant service, program, 
or activity is the right to refuse treatment. See, e.g., Disability 
Rights Br. 22, 26. In between those statements, it contends 
that the service, program, or activity is New Jersey’s 
“provision of a wide range of medical services for persons 
with and without disabilities.” Id. at 23. Still other parts 
suggest that the service, program, or activity is actually the 
use of judicial process prior to forcible medication. See, e.g., 
id. at 1 (“[AB 5:04B] permits the State to override the most 
fundamental right of a person to be free of unwanted medical 
treatment . . . without any court authorization or supervision.” 
(emphasis added)); Disability Rights Reply Br. 13–14 (“The 
issue here is whether the State can subject involuntarily 
committed persons with mental illness to special non-judicial 
procedures, taking away on ‘dangerousness’ grounds their 
right to refuse treatment for mental illness when no other 
person and no other type of illness (even if it is a dangerous 
illness) is subjected to this type of restriction.” (emphasis 
added)); id. at 23 (“The discrimination is evident from the 
face of AB 5:04B, because it only takes away the right of 
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persons with mental illness to refuse medical treatment, while 
all other persons—regardless of their disease—retain the right 
to refuse treatment absent a court order requiring otherwise.” 
(emphasis added)). The same confusion is evident in 
Disability Rights’ memorandum in opposition to the State’s 
motion for summary judgment. Compare App. 2375–76 
(describing the service, program, or activity as either the right 
to refuse treatment or the provision of medical services) with 
App. 2378 (“DRNJ does not dispute that psychotropic 
medication may be an important—even necessary—part of 
any individual patient’s treatment plan. However, this issue is 
factually and legally distinct from the necessity of a 
disparately applied policy permitting the forcible medication 
without a hearing and without representation.” (emphasis in 
original)). 
 This ambiguity prompted the Court to inquire about 
the identity of the relevant service, program, or activity at oral 
argument. Disability Rights cabined the service, program, or 
activity in question as a premedication judicial process: 
The Court: What is the service[,] 
program or activity of the 
state from which your 
clients are excluded? 
Disability Rights: The service[,] program or 
activity would be the right 
to refuse treatment that will 
not be overcome by a 
judicial hearing, only by a 
judicial hearing.  
 . . . . 
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The Court: Please define as succinctly 
and slowly as you can—
because I think this is critical 
for the ADA claim—what is 
the service[,] program or 
activity[?] You started by 
saying it’s a process. . . . 
What process? 
Disability Rights: A judicial hearing. 
The Court: Okay. . . . All right. Then 
it’s not about forcible 
medication. You agree that 
people can be forcibly 
medicated, but you say 
[they] can’t be forcibly 
medicated unless they have 
a judicial hearing. 
Disability Rights: Correct. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. at 17–18. Other representations by Disability 
Rights during oral argument demonstrate that the relevant 
service, program, or activity is not the right to refuse 
treatment in general, but instead premedication judicial 
process. See, e.g., id. at 3 (“This case is about whether the 
state of New Jersey can, in the absence of an emergency, 
forcibly medicate competent persons in the state mental 
hospitals without a judicial hearing when no other group, no 
other illness can be forcibly treated without a judicial 
hearing.”); id. at 16 (“And the process is key to providing 
these individuals the same rights that every other person 
enjoys, which goes to our ADA argument, that every other 
person in New Jersey will not have the right to refuse 
treatment overridden absent a court order.”); id. at 45 (“[T]he 
21 
 
issue is not that no other person is being forcibly medicated. 
It’s that if the state wants to forcibly medicate those 
individuals with those illnesses, they have to follow the 
process with a judicial hearing.”). These representations are 
consistent with the relief requested in Disability Rights’ 
amended complaint. See App. 321–22 (requesting as relief, 
inter alia, a “plan and schedule” to ensure that patients 
refusing to consent to the administration of psychotropic 
drugs receive a “judicial hearing,” “representation by counsel 
at said hearing,” a system for “appointing experienced and 
knowledgeable counsel,” appointing “independent expert 
witnesses” for patients, and requiring a “clear and convincing 
evidence” standard of proof for involuntary medication). 
 Courts routinely invite litigants to clarify their 
positions and legal theories at oral argument, and when 
litigants accept such invitations, courts routinely hold them to 
their representations. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 
209, 221 (2005) (recognizing a party’s withdrawal of a 
concession at argument); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 
(1988) (construing a municipal ordinance narrowly in 
accordance with the view expressed by the municipality 
during argument); Coar v. Kazimir, 990 F.2d 1413, 1415 n.2 
(3d Cir. 1993) (narrowing the scope of the dispute at issue 
based on a party’s representations at argument). We accept at 
face value Disability Rights’ assertions during oral argument 
that the relevant service, program, or activity is the right to 
premedication judicial process.  
 And it is proper to hold Disability Rights to its word 
because there is significant evidence that the service, 
program, or activity at issue in this case is, in fact, procedural 
in nature. As a general matter, the scope of a remedy for a 
violation of law is necessarily limited by the scope of the law 
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itself. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88 (1995) 
(“The nature of the . . . remedy is to be determined by the 
nature and scope of the constitutional violation.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). In the context of a Title II case, 
the equitable remedy sought is generally an injunction 
requiring the defendant public entity to give the disabled 
plaintiff “meaningful access” to the service, program, or 
activity from which he has unlawfully been excluded on the 
basis of his disability. See, e.g., Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 
571 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[Title II’s] prohibition 
against discrimination is universally understood as a 
requirement to provide ‘meaningful access.’”); Henrietta D. 
v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 282 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that a 
“reasonable accommodation” is one that gives an otherwise 
qualified plaintiff with a disability “meaningful access” to the 
program or service sought). In other words, there is a nexus 
between the remedy sought and the service, program, or 
activity. 
 Here, there is no debate that the remedy demanded by 
Disability Rights is an order requiring New Jersey to provide 
judicial hearings (and associated procedural protections) prior 
to nonemergent forcible medication. Where, as here, a party 
clearly articulates the remedy sought but offers shifting or 
perhaps ambiguous indications as to the corresponding 
service, program, or activity, we can (and should) infer from 
that remedy the true identity of the service, program, or 
activity. See, e.g., Yeskey, 118 F.3d at 169–72 (holding that a 
prison “boot camp” program qualified as an service, program, 
or activity after a disabled prisoner sued to be allowed to 
participate), aff’d, 524 U.S. 206 (1998). The undisputed fact 
that Disability Rights seeks only a procedural remedy is thus 
compelling evidence that the service, program, or activity is 
procedural too. 
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 We have determined—by looking to the briefs, the 
record, and oral argument—the nature of the claim Disability 
Rights itself chose to pursue. A party’s confusion over the 
contours of its own claim (whether inadvertent or strategic) 
does not excuse a court from construing it. And there is surely 
a difference between “constru[ing] ambiguous filings to make 
sense out of them,” as we do here, and “recharacterizing” a 
claim in order to give it a better chance of success. Mata v. 
Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150, 2157 (Thomas, J., dissenting). We 
therefore proceed on the understanding that the relevant 
service, program, or activity for purposes of the ADA claim is 
the right to judicial process before medication is forcibly 
administered in nonemergent situations. 
B 
 The fatal defect in Disability Rights’ ADA claim is 
that this right does not exist in New Jersey for nondisabled 
people, which means the denial of that right to psychiatric 
patients is not discriminatory. All New Jersey citizens are 
entitled to the judicial processes attendant to civil 
commitment. After that point, however, and once an 
individual’s care is entrusted to the State, there are no 
additional premedication judicial processes available to 
anyone. In fact, Disability Rights repeatedly states in its 
opening brief that no one in the State but civilly committed 
psychiatric patients is subject to forcible medication at all. 
See, e.g., Disability Rights Br. 1 (“Notably, the State cannot 
forcibly treat persons with other illnesses without their 
consent, even if the State unequivocally believes those 
persons ‘need’ the treatment to get better.”); id. at 25 (“AB 
5:04B deprives persons with mental illness in state 
psychiatric hospitals of the right to refuse medical treatment 
even though persons without mental illness retain their right 
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to refuse treatment[.]”). Our own review of New Jersey law 
persuades us that Disability Rights is basically correct. For 
example, mentally ill prisoners are subject to forcible 
medication, but they are entitled only to procedures that 
closely track the Policy. See N.J. Admin. Code § 10A:16-11.1 
et seq. Beyond prisoners and the civilly committed, New 
Jersey law broadly protects the right of hospital patients to 
refuse medication and treatment. See id. § 8:43G-4.1(a)(8). 
The nonexistent provision of specific procedural protections 
before such forcible treatment occurs cannot be a service, 
program, or activity of the State.  
 In its reply brief, Disability Rights suggests that some 
other New Jerseyans are subject to court-ordered treatment 
without their consent. See, e.g., Disability Rights Reply Br. 6 
(“New Jersey courts consistently have held that legally 
competent adults have the right to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment, except in rare instances of an overriding court 
order.”). And, indeed, New Jersey law allows courts to order 
incompetent or incapacitated—i.e., disabled—people to 
undergo certain forms of medical treatment even though they 
are incapable of consenting. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-
24.2(d)(2) (allowing courts to order necessary “experimental 
research, shock treatment, psychosurgery or sterilization” of 
psychiatric patients adjudicated to be incapacitated); Matter 
of Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 451 (N.J. 1987) (suggesting that 
judicial action can sometimes forestall the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment from incompetent patients whose wishes 
are unknown). 
 But even if we set aside the critical distinctions 
between such scenarios and the treatment program at issue 
here, New Jersey’s provision of judicial process in those 
circumstances does not establish actionable discrimination 
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under the ADA in this case. The fact that other disabled 
people in the State may be entitled to judicial process before 
they are treated without their consent does not mean New 
Jersey violates the ADA by forcibly medicating psychiatric 
patients under the Policy. The ADA does not require 
procedural uniformity in all public efforts to deal with the 
various challenges associated with caring for the disabled. In 
Traynor v. Turnage, the Supreme Court held that “nothing in 
the Rehabilitation Act”—which, as we have discussed, 
substantively parallels Title II—“requires that any benefit 
extended to one category of handicapped persons also be 
extended to all other categories of handicapped persons.” 485 
U.S. 535, 549 (1988); see also Ford v. Schering-Plough 
Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The ADA does not 
require equal coverage for every type of disability[.]”); 
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and 
Local Government Services, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,694, 35,705 
(July 26, 1991) (“State and local governments may provide 
special benefits . . . that are limited to individuals with 
disabilities or a particular class of individuals with 
disabilities[] without thereby incurring additional obligations 
to persons without disabilities or to other classes of 
individuals with disabilities.” (discussing 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.130(c))). The mere fact that a State’s law provides for 
judicial process before certain disabled people can be 
medically treated without their informed consent does not 
mean the State must follow identical procedures when it 
permits other disabled people to be treated against their will. 
In short, Disability Rights has not cited and we are unaware 
of any case holding that a Title II violation can be stated in 
the absence of an allegation that a qualified person with a 
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disability has been denied access to a public service, program, 
or activity to which nondisabled people have access.4 
 In support of its ADA claim, Disability Rights leans 
heavily upon Hargrave v. Vermont, in which the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a Vermont statute 
violated Title II. 340 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 2003). The statute at 
issue altered Vermont law relating to the durable power of 
attorney for health care (DPOA), a document that appoints a 
guardian to make health-care decisions in the event of the 
executor’s incapacity and “articulat[es] preferences for or 
limitations on treatment.” Hargrave, 340 F.3d at 31. Prior to 
the law, a DPOA could be revoked only by the executor 
himself or by a probate court in conjunction with the 
appointment of a guardian for the executor. Id. The law 
                                                 
 4 The only apparent exception to this rule arises in the 
context of unnecessary institutionalization, which is not the 
conduct at issue here. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 598 (holding 
that unjustified institutionalization of disabled people who are 
qualified for noninstitutional care can violate Title II even 
when no nondisabled people are given preferential treatment); 
Helen L., 46 F.3d at 332–33. Significantly, these cases rely on 
the “integration mandate,” a regulation obligating States to 
administer services in the “most integrated setting appropriate 
to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities” and 
effectively defining unnecessary institutionalization as a form 
of discrimination under Title II. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d). 
Disability Rights neither invokes the integration mandate nor 
identifies anything in the ADA or its implementing 
regulations providing that a State’s procedural inconsistency 
in confronting different disability-related issues was a 
problem Congress intended to eliminate. 
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authorized health care professionals at state psychiatric 
hospitals to petition a court to override a civilly committed 
person’s DPOA to permit forcible medication in 
nonemergency situations. See id. Nancy Hargrave, an 
involuntarily committed woman suffering from 
schizophrenia, sued to enjoin enforcement of the law after 
being forcibly medicated and executing a DPOA refusing 
further treatment with “any and all anti-psychotic, 
neuroleptic, psychotropic or psychoactive medications.” Id. at 
32 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 In holding that the law violated Title II, the Second 
Circuit concluded that it unlawfully discriminated against 
mentally ill people by enabling Vermont to override their 
refusal of medical treatment, a power the State could not exert 
over others. Id. at 38 (characterizing the relevant service, 
program, or activity as “the statutorily created opportunity to 
execute a DPOA for health care and the right to have it 
recognized and followed” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Hargrave identified a service, program, or activity that was 
made available to everyone (i.e., Vermont’s policy of 
recognizing DPOAs that could not be overridden on the 
motion of a doctor) and alleged that she had been excluded 
therefrom because of her disability. Conversely, here 
Disability Rights posits a service, program, or activity (the 
use of judicial hearings and attendant procedural protections 
prior to nonemergency forcible medication) that does not 
exist for any nondisabled people. Hargrave thus supports our 
view that a Title II claim must allege that a disabled person 
has been denied some benefit that a public entity has 
extended to nondisabled people—a burden Disability Rights 
does not carry here. 
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C 
 Excusing this defect in Disability Rights’ legal theory 
would be problematic. We note that Disability Rights would 
have us unravel a policy that may well be equal or superior to 
the judicial model it demands.5 The State asserts that the 
Policy was developed at least in part with bona fide concerns 
for patient welfare in mind. See N.J. Br. 10–11. Disability 
Rights has not produced any evidence that judicial hearings 
would more effectively prevent unnecessary medication than 
the Policy—for example, it has not shown that psychiatric 
patients are medicated with appreciably less frequency in 
States that do provide judicial process.6 See App. 298 (Am. 
                                                 
5 In addition, allowing such a challenge could 
improperly transform the ADA from an antidiscrimination 
statute into a law regulating the quality of care the States 
provide to the disabled. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603 n.14 
(“We do not in this opinion hold that the ADA imposes on the 
States a ‘standard of care’ for whatever medical services they 
render, or that the ADA requires States to ‘provide a certain 
level of benefits to individuals with disabilities.’”). To do so 
would impose “significant federalism costs” by subverting 
“the States’ historical role as the dominant authority 
responsible for providing services to individuals with 
disabilities.”  Id. at 624–25 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 6 At least as to non-CEPP patients, it would be 
surprising if judicial hearings had a significant impact on the 
frequency of forcible medication in New Jersey. When a New 
Jersey judge commits a mentally ill person to state custody, 
he orders “involuntary commitment to treatment.” N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 30:4-27.10 (emphasis added). In addition, the 
substantive standards for involuntary commitment and 
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Compl. ¶ 147) (listing 29 States in which psychiatric patients 
are entitled to judicial hearings before being forcibly 
medicated). While it urges us to extend the coverage of Title 
II beyond what the statute will bear, Disability Rights also 
fails to show that invalidating the Policy would actually serve 
the interests of psychiatric patients in New Jersey. 
 For the reasons stated, we hold that Disability Rights 
has failed to allege a prima facie violation of Title II of the 
ADA because the provision of judicial process before the 
nonemergent administration of psychotropic drugs is not a 
“service, program, or activity” of New Jersey from which the 
civilly committed are excluded. Since this flaw in Disability 
Rights’ ADA claim applies equally to CEPP and non-CEPP 
patients, we will affirm the District Court’s summary 
judgment for New Jersey as to the non-CEPP patients and 
reverse the summary judgment for Disability Rights as to the 
CEPP patients on the ADA claim. 
V 
 Having rejected Disability Rights’ statutory claims, we 
turn now to its constitutional claims. The District Court split 
its analysis of the due process claim into substantive and 
                                                                                                             
forcible medication are so strikingly similar that different 
results at the same patient’s commitment and medication 
hearings are unlikely. Civil commitment requires a substantial 
likelihood that the person will harm himself, others, or 
property “within the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. § 
30:4-27.2(h)–(i). For a person to be forcibly medicated under 
the Policy, there must be a “substantial risk” that, “within the 
reasonably foreseeable future,” the patient will do “serious 
harm to self, others, or property if psychotropic medication is 
not administered[.]” App. 1393, 1396. 
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procedural components, but we focus on procedural due 
process. Because the due process analysis is different for non-
CEPP and CEPP patients, we evaluate them separately. 
A 
 As the Policy relates to non-CEPP patients, our 
analysis is guided by Harper, in which the Supreme Court 
held that a prison procedure virtually identical to the Policy 
satisfied due process. In that case, Washington State confined 
Harper, a convicted felon, to its Special Offender Center, a 
facility housing prisoners with serious mental illnesses. 494 
U.S. at 214. After the State treated Harper with antipsychotic 
drugs against his will, Harper filed a § 1983 suit “claiming 
that the failure to provide a judicial hearing before the 
involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication” 
violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 217. As Disability 
Rights admits, New Jersey’s Policy is essentially identical to 
the Washington policy at issue in Harper, which required 
approval of forcible medication by a three-person committee 
accompanied by various other procedural protections. See 
Disability Rights Reply Br. 33 n.6 (resisting New Jersey’s 
argument that the Policy is more protective by claiming that 
the only two differences are illusory). 
 The Supreme Court began its review of the 
Washington policy by holding that, in light of the side effects 
and mind-altering nature of psychotropic drugs, Harper had 
“a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process 
Clause,” Harper, 494 U.S. at 221, but that this interest could 
be outweighed in appropriate circumstances by “the State’s 
interests in prison safety and security,” id. at 223. It rejected 
the notion that the Due Process Clause forbids a State from 
forcibly medicating a prisoner unless he has been found to be 
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incompetent. Id. at 222. The Court then proceeded to consider 
the procedural sufficiency of the Washington policy using the 
balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
Although the Court acknowledged Harper’s strong interest in 
refusing unwanted treatment, it rejected the notion that 
forcible medication decisions had to be made by judges rather 
than medical professionals. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 229–31. 
“The risks associated with antipsychotic drugs are for the 
most part medical ones, best assessed by medical 
professionals,” the Court said. Id. at 233. “A State may 
conclude with good reason that a judicial hearing will not be 
as effective, as continuous, or as probing as administrative 
review using medical decisionmakers.” Id. The Court also 
specifically dismissed Harper’s complaints that the 
Washington policy did not require a “clear and convincing” 
standard of proof or the right to counsel. Id. at 235–36. 
 Attempting to distinguish Harper, Disability Rights 
insists repeatedly: “New Jersey psychiatric hospitals are not 
prisons and their patients are not prisoners.” Disability Rights 
Reply Br. 30 (emphasis in original); see also Disability Rights 
Br. 2, 46, 53, 55–57. For support, it quotes caselaw holding 
that involuntarily committed people “are entitled to more 
considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than 
criminals.” Disability Rights Br. 53 (quoting Youngberg, 457 
U.S. at 321–22). But Disability Rights omits a critical part of 
the quotation from Youngberg: “Persons who have been 
involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate 
treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose 
conditions of confinement are designed to punish,” the Court 
wrote. 457 U.S. at 321–22 (emphasis added). It is indisputable 
that the Due Process Clause permits harsher treatment of 
prisoners than civilly committed people insofar as the harsher 
treatment relates to the punitive nature of incarceration. But the 
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Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that forcible treatment of 
mentally ill prisoners cannot be a component of a State’s 
program of punishment. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 241 (“Forced 
administration of antipsychotic medication may not be used as 
a form of punishment.”); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 
(1980) (“[I]nvoluntary commitment to a mental hospital is not 
within the range of conditions of confinement to which a 
prison sentence subjects an individual.”). This principle is 
borne out by the Supreme Court’s indication that the logic of 
Harper applies to the forcible medication of pretrial detainees. 
See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992). 
 Because forced administration of psychotropic drugs 
can be used only for safety and treatment reasons in both the 
prison and civil commitment contexts, there is no relevant 
distinction between Harper and this case for due process 
purposes, at least with respect to non-CEPP patients. See 
Jurasek v. Utah State Hosp., 158 F.3d 506, 511 (10th Cir. 
1998) (rejecting a similar due process challenge to forcible 
medication on the ground that Harper applies in the civil 
commitment context as long as similar procedural protections 
are afforded). It would be passing strange if due process were 
to permit the State to forcibly medicate a criminal whose 
conviction bears no suggestion of physical dangerousness 
without a judicial hearing, while mandating judicial hearings 
for mentally ill people who have already been adjudicated to 
be so dangerous as to require civil commitment. Therefore, 
we will affirm the District Court’s summary judgment in 
favor of New Jersey on the due process claim with respect to 
non-CEPP patients. 
B 
 As for CEPP patients—individuals who have been 
found by a court to no longer be sufficiently dangerous to 
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need involuntary confinement, but who remain in custody 
pending transfer to an appropriate community-based 
placement—we agree with the District Court that the due 
process claim has merit. Disability Rights is correct that 
Harper, which did not address situations in which a State 
wishes to forcibly medicate a person who has already been 
adjudicated by a court to be nondangerous, does not control 
with respect to CEPP patients. Accordingly, we turn to the 
familiar Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test. See Harper, 494 
U.S. at 229 (using Mathews to analyze procedural due process 
rights in the forcible medication context). 
 Mathews requires us to weigh three factors: (1) “the 
private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) 
“the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the 
Government’s interest, including the function involved and 
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. at 
335. Application of these factors persuades us to agree with 
the District Court that the Policy violates the Due Process 
Clause with respect to CEPP patients. 
 First, as the Supreme Court held in Harper, an 
individual’s interest in avoiding the unwarranted 
administration of psychotropic drugs is, to say the least, “not 
insubstantial.” 494 U.S. at 229. Psychotropic medication 
alters and regulates the patient’s cognitive processes and can 
trigger serious side effects. Id. at 229–30. A patient’s interest 
in avoiding such an invasion of his bodily integrity can only 
be greater when a court of law has already declared him fit to 
return to life in the community. 
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 Meanwhile, the risk of erroneous results in the absence 
of a judicial hearing is considerably higher than in the non-
CEPP context. When New Jersey applies the Policy to a 
CEPP patient, it effectively vacates a court’s prior 
determination that the patient is not dangerous. Such a 
decision may be appropriate in some circumstances—CEPP 
patients are only entitled to judicial review hearings every six 
months after their first 60 days on CEPP status, so they have 
plenty of time in State custody in which to relapse into 
dangerousness. See N.J. Ct. R. 4:74-7(h)(2). But allowing the 
Policy to be applied to CEPP patients would permit the State 
to forcibly medicate a patient just a few days after a judge has 
deemed the patient no longer dangerous. In such 
circumstances, due process may require the hospital and the 
commitment court to agree that the basis for a previous 
judicial finding of nondangerousness no longer exists. 
 Finally, the State’s interest in denying judicial process 
to CEPP patients seems slight. Although we disagree with the 
District Court’s statement that the State “has no interest in 
continuing to forcibly medicate” CEPP patients, Disability 
Rights N.J., 974 F. Supp. 2d at 729, New Jersey admits that it 
has “very rarely” sought to forcibly medicate CEPP patients 
pursuant to the Policy, N.J. Br. 69 n.14. For those CEPP 
patients who do relapse while in custody, the State may 
invoke AB 5:04A to address any emergency until a judicial 
hearing can be held. And if providing judicial process for all 
psychiatric patients would result in just a five-percent 
increase in hearings, as Disability Rights asserts and the State 
does not contest, see Disability Rights Br. 37, then the “fiscal 
or administrative burden[]” imposed on New Jersey by a 
judicial hearing requirement for CEPP patients would be light 
indeed, Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
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 The balance among these three factors convinces us 
that, as the District Court held, the State cannot apply the 
Policy to CEPP patients consistent with due process of law. 
To hold otherwise would permit psychiatric hospitals to 
forcibly treat patients with mind-altering drugs even after a 
judge has ruled that the factual basis for their continued civil 
commitment has disappeared. If a patient actually remains so 
dangerous as to require long-term, nonemergent forcible 
medication, the appropriate course for the State is to 
recommit the patient through normal judicial channels, not to 
leave the patient on CEPP status. We will therefore affirm the 
District Court’s summary judgment for Disability Rights on 
the due process claim with respect to CEPP patients. 
 Our analysis effectively disposes of the constitutional 
claims arising under the right of access to the courts, the right 
to counsel, and the right to freely think and communicate. 
Harper, as discussed above, squarely rejects the first two of 
those claims. See 494 U.S. at 231 (“[W]e conclude that an 
inmate’s interests are adequately protected, and perhaps better 
served, by allowing the decision to medicate to be made by 
medical professionals rather than a judge.”); id. at 236 (“[I]t 
is less than crystal clear why lawyers must be available to 
identify possible errors in medical judgment.” (quoting 
Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 
330 (1985))). The claim based on the right to freely think and 
communicate is duplicative of the general due process claim 
and can be resolved on the same grounds. We have long held 
that a civilly committed person’s right to be free from 
unwanted treatment with mind-altering drugs is a qualified 
one, see Rennie II, 720 F.2d at 272 (Seitz, C.J., concurring), 
and there is no reason to think that the Harper hearings 
provided under the Policy impermissibly infringe upon that 
right. 
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* * * 
 In implementing the Policy, the State of New Jersey 
discharged one of its most important and daunting 
responsibilities: the care and custody of people too mentally 
ill to live in freedom. New Jersey determined that, while 
judges have an important role to play in the civil commitment 
process, matters of medical treatment are more appropriately 
handled by medical professionals. We conclude that the 
State’s approach comports with the demands of the 
Constitution and the Americans with Disabilities Act, except 
as to CEPP patients, whose constitutional rights entitle them 
to judicial process before psychotropic medication may be 
forcibly administered. An appropriate order follows. 
